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Abstract: 
 
We extend the celebrated Chamley-Judd result of zero capital income tax and show that the steady state 
optimal capital income tax is nonzero, in general. In particular, we find that the optimal plan involves 
zero capital income tax in investment sector and a nonzero capital income tax in consumption sector. In 
a two sector neoclassical economy, interdependence of labour and capital margins allows the 
government to choose an optimal policy that involves nonzero tax on capital income. The distortion 
created by capital income tax in consumption sector can be undone by setting different rates of labour 
income taxes. The optimal plan thus involves zero capital income tax in both sectors only if optimal 
labour income taxes are equal. This may not be the optimal policy if marginal disutility of work is 
different across sectors and/or the social marginal value of capital is different across sectors. The 
difference in social marginal value of capital can be undone by setting different labour income taxes 
across sectors.  We also show that if the government faces a constraint of keeping same capital and 
labour income tax rates across sectors, optimal capital income tax is nonzero. 
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Introduction. 
 
In this paper, we show that the optimal capital income tax in a standard two sector 
neoclassical economy is nonzero, in general. We follow Ramsey’s (1927) methodology of 
optimal taxation and apply Ramsey’s idea that consumers and firms react to changes in fiscal 
policy in a two sector dynamic model of taxation. We are motivated by the celebrated finding 
of Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) that in a one sector neoclassical economy with 
competitive markets, the long run optimal policy involves zero tax on capital income. We 
examine the strength of this result in a broader class of dynamic general equilibrium models. 
We contribute by showing that the long run optimal policy involves zero capital income tax in 
investment sector and a nonzero capital income tax in consumption sector. The distortion 
created by nonzero capital income tax can be undone by setting different rates of labour 
income taxes. We find a set of conditions on labour income taxes and preferences for which 
our model recovers the Chamley-Judd result. The condition on labour income taxes is not 
confirmed by equilibrium conditions, and the preference restrictions are not general. We 
therefore conclude that Chamley-Judd result in our setting is a special and not the general 
case. 
 
The dynamic general equilibrium approach to the optimal taxation problem established in 
literature follows Ramsey’s (1927) seminal paper that formally recognized that consumers 
and firms react to changes in fiscal policy. Literature on optimal taxation of factor income in 
dynamic settings , ever since its advancement and sophistication, has established a set of 
celebrated substantive results. A comprehensive survey is presented in Erosa & Gervais 
(2001), and in Chari & Kehoe (1999). In the context of standard neoclassical growth model 
with infinitely-lived individuals, Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) establish that an optimal 
income-tax policy entails taxing capital at confiscatory rates in the short run and setting 
capital income taxes equal to zero in the long run. This result is judicious since a positive tax 
on the return from today’s savings effectively makes consumption next period more 
expensive relative to consumption in the current period. In an infinitely-lived agent’s model, 
therefore, a positive tax on capital income in the steady state implies that the implicit tax rate 
of consumption in future has an unbounded increasing trend. This form of tax distortions is 
inconsistent with commodity tax principle, which is why taxing capital income cannot be 
optimal. 
 
The current paper approaches the standard Ramsey problem using the primal approach in a 
dynamic general equilibrium set up of a two-sector model economy with demarcated features. 
The main result of this paper is based on the intuition that in a two sector economy, labour  
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and capital margins are interdependent which is unlike a one sector economy. This 
interdependence implies that the optimal policy of capital income taxation depends on the 
optimal policy of labour income taxation. Thus in a two sector economy, the optimal policy 
may involve nonzero capital income tax rate since the distortion created by this tax can be 
undone by differential labour income taxes. When new capital is a final good and used in both 
sectors, the social marginal value of capital in the two sectors are very likely to be different. 
Additional investment in consumption sector is associated with a social marginal value of 
capital that is different from the social marginal value of capital in investment sector. The 
Ramsey planner’s optimum satisfies two intertemporal equations for capital accumulation in 
two sectors; but capital is produced in one of them. The discounted returns from investment in 
both sectors are therefore equal to the social marginal value of capital in investment sector. 
We show that this equality is consistent with the general result of nonzero capital income tax 
rate in consumption sector. We argue that a nonzero capital income tax in consumption sector 
would not have potential compounding distortion effect, since economic agents have the 
option of shifting depreciated capital to the sector where its income is untaxed. The nonzero 
capital income tax in the consumption goods sector becomes, in terms of consequences, a tax 
which has uniform distortion pattern, similar to a period by period consumption tax, for 
example. 
 
We find that if the optimal labour income taxes are equal across sectors, one can recover the 
Chamley-Judd result in our model. This may hold if the marginal disutility of work across 
sectors is same, implying that the before tax wages are same. Such preference restrictions are 
not general. Optimal labour income taxes may be equal across sectors if the social marginal 
value of capital is same across sectors, implying that relative price of consumption and 
relative price of new capital are equal. Our main result that capital income tax is nonzero in 
one sector is therefore based on the deviation of one relative price against the other. If relative 
price of investment goods is different from that of consumption goods, it is possible to 
tax/subsidize capital income because the distortion caused by the capital income tax might be 
undone by the relative price difference. If one assumes that the relative prices are equal, this 
would imply that the before tax rental rates of capital are same across sectors. The 
decentralized equilibrium is not consistent with this assumption. The nonzero capital income 
tax in consumption sector is therefore the general result. We consider the case where the 
government faces an ex ante constraint of keeping the two labour income tax rates and the 
two capital income tax rates equal across sectors. Restricting the government’s choice of 
income taxes ex ante triggers an outcome with both nonzero capital income tax rates. 
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The set of policies which generates allocations that can be implemented as competitive 
equilibrium, as this paper advocates, prescribes that the optimal steady state capital income 
tax for capital goods sector is unambiguously zero, but the steady state optimal capital income 
tax for consumption goods sector is only conditionally zero. The set of conditions for which 
the celebrated Chamley-Judd result can be established, as characterized in three experiments 
using variants of utility functions, are neither inferred by the model nor justified by simple 
intuitions. In general, the steady state optimal capital tax for consumption goods sector can 
therefore be nonzero. 
 
 
The Decentralized Economy. 
 
Time is discrete and runs forever. The economy has two production sectors indexed by j, 
where j = C, X denotes the consumption and investment sector, producing perishable 
consumption goods and new investment goods, respectively. There is a continua of measure 
one of identical, infinitely lived households, of identical firms in sector C that own a 
technology with which consumption goods can be produced, and of identical firms in sector X 
that own a technology with which new capital goods can be produced. The representative 
household is endowed with initial capital stock, with the property rights of the firms, and with 
one unit of time at each period. Firms combine capital and labor, the two factors of 
production, for final production. All households have identical preferences over intertemporal 
consumption and work. The representative household derives utility from consumption (ct) 
and disutility from work. Working time in sector j  is denoted by jn . Household’s 
preferences for consumption and labor service streams ¥=0txtctt nnc },,{ , can be defined by the 
utility function over infinite horizon: 
 
å
¥
=
=
0
101010
t
xtctt
t
xxcc nncnnnncc ),,u(,....),,.....,,,......,,U( b      (1) 
 
where the subjective discount rate is b  and b ),( 10Î . The utility function satisfies 
regularity conditions. The household purchases new capital goods and rents capital to the 
firms for one period. Capital decays at the fixed rate ),( 10Îd . Firms return the rented capital 
stock next period net of depreciation d , and pay unit cost of capital employed, equal to jr . 
The consumption sector’s technology is: 
 
 5 
),(F c ctcttt nkgc £+         (2.1) 
 
where tg  is exogenously determined government consumption expenditure. The investment 
sector’s technology is: 
 
),(F xtxt
x
xtct nkxx £+        (2.2) 
 
where jtx  denotes new investment goods. The technology ),(F jj
j nk  satisfies standard 
regularity conditions and exhibits constant returns to scale. The government finances the 
exogenous stream of consumption expenditures { }¥=0ttg solely by linearly taxing income from 
capital and labor employed in both sectors. Throughout the paper, the assumption that the 
government has access to some commitment device, or a commitment technology that allows 
the government to commit itself once and for all to the sequence of tax rates announced at 
time 0, is maintained. The government taxes labor income and capital income at rates jtt  per 
unit and jtq  per unit , respectively. The government runs a balanced budget each period. The 
government’s budget constraint for all time t can be written as: 
 
xtxt
x
tctct
c
txtxt
x
tctct
c
tt krkrnwnwg qqtt +++=       (3) 
 
The consumption good is the numeraire. Let tp  denote the relative price of a new capital 
good. The representative household chooses allocations in order to maximize discounted 
lifetime utility subject to: 
 
][)()(][ xtxt
c
tcttxtxt
x
tctct
c
txtcttt RkRkpnwnwkkpc ++-+-£++ ++ tt 1111  (4) 
 
where )]()([ dq -+-º - 111 jt
j
tt
j
t rpR . The representative firm in sector j  competitively 
maximizes profits. Competitive pricing ensures that returns are equal to their marginal value 
products. This implies that the equilibrium factor prices are  
)(),(),(),( tFpwtFprtFwtFr xnxtxt
x
kxtxt
c
ncct
c
kcct ==== . 
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Definition  (Competitive Equilibrium):  A competitive equilibrium is an allocation 
( xcxcxc kkxxnngc ,,,,,,, ), a price system ( prrww xcxc ,,,, ), and a government policy 
),,,( xcxc qqtt  such that 
(a) Given the price system and the government policy, the allocation 
( xcxcxc kkxxnnc ,,,,,, ) solves the representative household’s problem; 
(b) Given the price system, the allocation ( cc kngc ,,, )solves the problem of the 
representative firm in sector C; 
(c) Given the price system, the allocation ( xxxc knxx ,,, )solves the problem of the 
representative firm in sector X; 
(d) The markets clear.         
 
Given the assumption about the utility function, the household’s budget constraint is satisfied 
with equality in equilibrium. The government policy, the household’s budget constraint and 
the two resource constraints imply that the government budget constraint holds in 
equilibrium.  Given total time endowment at each period for the household, define 
RR2 ®Á +: with Á (strictly) convex, such that the total time allocation constraint can be 
written as 1£Á ),( xtct nn . For (strict) convexity of the function RR
2 ®Á +: , imposing 
separability, the household’s utility function is (non) linear in labour. Combining the  
necessary conditions derived from the representative household’s problem, the necessary 
conditions derived from the firms’ problems, the resource and time allocation constraints, it 
can be shown that the (competitive) equilibrium dynamics is characterized by the 
Transversality conditions together with the following system of equations in the set of 
unknowns { }xtctxtcttxtctxtctxtctxtctt pwwrrnnkkc qqtt ,,,,,,,,,,,,, : 
 
1£Á ),( xtct nn          (5a) 
),(F c ctcttt nkgc =+         (5b) 
))((),(F xtctxtxt
x
xtct kknkkk +-+=+ ++ d111      (5c) 
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c
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c
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b
)(u
)(u
        (5g) 
)(F tr ckcct =          (5h) 
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)(F tw cncct =          (5i) 
)(F tpr xkxtxt =          (5j) 
)(F tpw xnxtxt =         (5k) 
 
Equation (5a) represents the time allocation constraint. Equations (5b) and (5c) represent 
goods market clearing conditions. The rest of the equations are the set of equilibrium 
conditions derived from household’s and firms’ optimization problems. A few observations 
deserve attention here. Note (5f) and (5g) together imply that after tax returns from capital are 
equal in a competitive equilibrium, but not the before tax rental rates. Note also that with (5d) 
and (5e), a non-unitary marginal rate of substitution of labor across sectors would imply that 
after tax wage rates are not equal in equilibrium. 
 
 
The Ramsey problem. 
 
We follow the primal approach to the Ramsey problem, in which the government can be 
thought of as directly choosing a feasible allocation, subject to constraints that ensure the 
existence of prices and taxes such that the chosen allocation is consistent with the 
optimization behaviour of household and firms. This approach is similar to those of Lucas & 
Stokey (1983), Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1993 & 1997), Chari & Kehoe (1999) and 
Ljungqvist & Sargent (2000). We introduce a single present-value budget constraint for the 
household. Note that in equilibrium xt
c
tt RRR =º . Consider, therefore, household’s time T 
budget constraint: 
 
][][)()( 1111 ++ +-+£---- xTcTTxTcTTTxTxT
x
TcTcT
c
TT kkpkkRpnwnwc tt  (6a) 
 
Let 1R
0
1s
s ºÕ
=
 be the numeraire. Divide (6a) by the period T term Õ
=
T
1s
sT Rp  and evaluate 
the resulting expression at time T-1. Then add these two and evaluate the resulting expression 
at time T-2. Iterating this procedure (and finally adding the time 0 expression) and taking the 
limit of both sides of the sum as ¥®T  results in the following expression: 
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Õ
¥
=
=
tt
    (6b) 
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where 0Rk
1t
1s
s1jtt =÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
-
=
+¥® Õlim  is already imposed since the present discounted value of 
the capital stock in sector j, j = C, X, in period t evaluated using period t market prices is 
asymptotically zero as ¥®t . Expression (6b) is the household’s present-value budget 
constraint, which says that the present value of consumption expenditures net of (net) labor 
earnings cannot exceed the value of the net initial assets. Assume that (6b) binds, i.e. there are 
no unused resources in the limit. Define the Arrow-Debreu price, 
1t
1s
s
1
t
o
t Rpq
-
=
-
÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
º Õ  such 
that (6b) becomes: 
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with 10
o
0 pq
-= . The first order conditions from household’s utility maximization problem 
with budget constraint (7) include: 
  
)(u
)(u
0p
t
q
c0
c
t
o
t
b
=         (8a) 
)(u
)(u
)(
t
t
w
c
nj
jt
j
t
-
=- t1         (8b) 
 
The formulation of the representative firms’ problems is unchanged, implying that the 
necessary conditions from firms’ problem are also unchanged. Use (8) to substitute out prices 
and taxes in (7) in order to derive : 
 
00 00000
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With x0
c
0 RR = , the time 0 definition of
j
tR  gives: 
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such that (9) may be rewritten as: 
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Expression (11) is, therefore, the intertemporal constraint that involves only allocations and 
initial capital income tax rates that can be implemented in a competitive equilibrium, and is 
known in literature as the implementability constraint of the corresponding Ramsey problem. 
The Ramsey problem for the government, therefore, is to choose allocations to maximize 
welfare subject to the two (binding) resource constraints and the implementability constraint. 
Let 0³F  be the Lagrange multiplier on (11), and define2 
 
])(u)(u)([u),,u(),,,V( xtnxctnctcxtcttxtctt ntntctnncnnc ++F+ºF   (12.1) 
 
With { }¥=0tt2t1 cc ,  as a sequence of Lagrange multipliers on the two resource constraints, for 
given government revenue target tg and initial capital endowment 0k , the problem is 
therefore to fix initial capital income tax rates c0q  and 
x
0q  and choose allocations to maximize 
welfare subject to (5b), (5c) and (11). The necessary conditions for an optimum for this 
problem due to changes in allocations are: 
 
1,)(V: 1 ³"= ttc tct c       (12.2a) 
11 ³"-= tttn
c
nctncct ),(F)(V: c     (12.2b) 
12 ³"-= tttn
x
nxtnxxt ),(F)(V: c     (12.2c)  
0)],1()1(F[: 121121 ³"-++= +++ ttk t
c
kcttct dccbc   (12.2d) 
0)],1()1([F: 1221 ³"-++= ++ ttk
x
kxttxt dbcc   (12.2e) 
0100 )0(V: ccc FW+= c   (12.2f) 
0100 )0(F)0(V: nc
c
ncnccn FW+-= c     (12.2g) 
0200 )0(F)0(V: nx
x
nxnxxn FW+-= c       (12.2h) 
                                                 
2The following expression (12.1) is commonly referred to as the Pseudo utility function which combines the utility 
function and the infinite horizon part of the implementability constraint.  
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Consolidating (12.2) yields the following five equations: 
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c
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Let N  denote the set of policies for which a competitive equilibrium exists. 
 
Definition  (Ramsey Equilibrium): A Ramsey equilibrium is a policy h  in N , an 
allocation rule (.)G , and a price system (.)}(.),(.),{(.) prw jj=R  for j = C, X, such that  
(a) The policy h  maximizes welfare subject to the resource constraints (5b) and (5c) and 
implementability constraint (11).  
(b) For every /h , the allocation )( /hG , the price system )( /hR , and the policy /h  
constitute a competitive equilibrium.        
 
First, note that Ramsey equilibrium requires optimality by households and firms for all 
policies that the government might choose. Hence for a given value of the initial price level p0  
for which the Transversality condition is satisfied, an allocation { }¥=++ 011 txtctxtctt kknnc ,,,,  and 
a multiplier F  that satisfy the system of difference equations presented by (13.1) will 
characterize the Ramsey equilibrium. Using the resulting Ramsey allocation, one can then 
compute the Ramsey equilibrium values of all endogenous variables of the system. 
 
 
The Steady State Optimal Policy. 
 
Consider a case in which there is a 0T ³  for which gg t =  for all Tt ³ . Assume solution 
to the Ramsey problem converges to a time-invariant allocation, so that allocations are 
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constant after some time. Then because )(tVc  converges to a constant, the time invariant 
version of (13.1a) implies: 
 
)]([F db -+= 11 xkx            (14.1a) 
 
Proposition 1:  The steady state optimal tax rate on capital income from investment 
sector is zero. 
 
Proof:  Steady state version of (5g) is: 
)](F)[( dqb -+-= 111 xkx
x        (14.1b) 
(14.1a) and (14.1b) together imply 0x =q .        
 
Proposition 1’s finding is similar to what Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986) find using a one-
sector model. This result is intuitive, since a nonzero tax rate on capital income in steady state 
would mean that distortions created by the tax evolves exponentially over time, contrary to a 
uniform distortion that might be created by simple labor or consumption taxes (see Judd 
(1999) for details). One cannot distort intertemporal margins because that leads to cumulative 
distortions. One way the current modelling approach differs from a conventional one-sector 
competitive model is how savings and capital accumulation occurs across sectors. Note that 
households pay a strictly positive relative price for the new capital goods and rent it out to 
firms in anticipation of income from investment. Firms return the rented capital stock net of 
depreciation. Of these two installed capital stocks, only xk  is required to produce future 
capital goods. Hence if capital income from xk  is taxed in a steady state, this will induce 
compounding nature of distortions.  
 
The optimal policy is different in general for capital income tax in consumption goods sector. 
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competitive equilibrium exists is therefore: 
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Proposition 2:  If the utility function is separable in consumption and labour and 
linear in labour, and if the government sets the labour income tax rates equal across sectors, 
the steady state optimal tax rate on capital income from consumption sector is zero. 
Otherwise, it is not zero. 
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derived from the Ramsey equilibrium system defined by (13.1),.  
Since ][V nxncxncnccnccncncnc ununucuu +++F+=  
and, ][V nxnxxncnxcnxcnxnxnx ununucuu +++F+= , the term 11
1
=ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
-
-
nc
x
nx
c
x
nx
c
kc
c
nc
x
kx
u
u
FF
FF
)(
)(
t
t
 if and 
only if (a) the utility function separable in consumption and labour and linear in labour, for 
which 
nx
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nx
nc
u
u
=
V
V
, and (b) the government sets labour income tax rates equal across sectors. 
Unless both conditions are satisfied simultaneously, 0¹cq .    
 
Notice that for utility function defined by (1), it is not explicitly assumed that utility is linear 
in labour , and that the marginal rate of substitution of labor across sectors is unitary. The first 
simplification is common in literature that deals with similar models, which (together with 
separability of utility function in consumption and labour) dramatically simplifies the 
expressions of njV  by ruling out the second and cross derivatives of labour services. The 
second simplification (unitary marginal rate of substitution of labour) would imply that after 
tax wages are equal across sectors. One way to abstract from this assumption is to assume that 
utility is derived from leisure, and that nnxnc uuu == . Such simplifications are not obvious 
where there exists some intratemporal adjustment cost of labor across sectors (see for 
instance, Huffman & Wynne (1999)). For such a class of utility functions where 
RR2 ®Á +:  is strictly convex, 
nx
nc
nx
nc
u
u
V
V
=  does not necessarily hold. The more important 
(than preference specification) condition is one on optimal labour income taxes. Notice that if 
nx
nc
nx
nc
u
u
V
V
= , 
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1
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c
t
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q
-
-
=- , and if cx tt >  capital income is subsidized. This is a classic 
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result on optimal policy in the sense that distortion caused by one instrument can be undone 
with another one 3. 
 
This particular analytical result has a very sharp intuition.  Since capital is produced in a 
different sector, nonzero capital income tax in the consumption sector is similar, in terms of 
consequences, to a simple consumption tax which has uniform distortion pattern. Since 
capital is freely movable across sectors, and following proposition 1, it is feasible  for the 
household to purchase new capital goods , invest the new capital xk  and both forms of the 
depreciated old capital goods in the capital goods sector. The next period capital to produce 
consumption goods is available through production of new capital goods. Hence, the 
depreciated capital good from consumption sector is transferred to investment sector for 
production. The household earns capital income from consumption sector in each period, gets 
taxed at a nonzero rate, and can avoid the compounding tax liabilities by shifting depreciated 
capital to the other sector. 
 
The intuition also can be drawn from the deviation in social marginal values of capital in two 
sectors. To see this more clearly, consider the Ramsey problem, but through Chamley’s 
(1986) approach. Using linear homogeneity property of the production functions, one can 
rewrite the government budget constraint: 
 
xtxtctctxtxtctctxtxt
x
tctct
c
t nwnwkrkrnkpnkg
~~~~),(F),(F ----+=   (15.1) 
 
where jt
j
tjt rr )1(
~ q-º  and jt
j
tjt ww )1(
~ t-º . Thus the government’s policy choice is 
constrained by (15.1), the two resource constraints and decentralized equilibrium conditions. 
The Lagrangian of the government’s problem is: 
 
                                                 
3 We keep the preference specification general in order to capture all possible results. Our main result is in no way 
driven by particular preference specification. Even if one assumes commonly used specification with 
nnxnc uuu == , our main result and main intuition are unchanged. 
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The solution to this problem gives the set of Ramsey equilibrium conditions. Consolidating 
and using decentralized equilibrium conditions, one derives: 
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Notice first that optimal labour income tax rates in both sectors depends crucially on the 
social marginal value of capital, t1f  and t2f . The Euler equation equivalents of Ramsey 
equilibrium are: 
 
{ })]()([F]~)(F[ dfybf -+++-+= ++++ 11tr1tp xkx1t21xtxkx1t1tt2    (17.1) 
{ })()(F]~)([F dffybf -+++-+= ++++ 11tr1t 1t2ckc1t11ctckc1tt2    (17.1) 
 
for changes in 1+xtk  and 1+ctk , respectively. These have straightforward interpretations. 
Condition (17.1) states that a marginal increment of capital investment in investment sector in 
period t increases the quantity of available capital goods at time (t+1) by the amount 
)]()([F d-++ 11txkx , which has social marginal value 1t2 +f . In addition, there is an increase 
in tax revenues equal to ]~)(F[ 1xt
x
kx1t r1tp ++ -+ , which enables the government to reduce 
other taxes by the same amount4. The reduction of this excess burden equals 
                                                 
4 In equilibrium, note that ]~)(F[ 1xt
x
kx1t r1tp ++ -+ = .1xt
x
1t r ++q  
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].~)(F[ 1xt
x
kx1t1t r1tp +++ -+y  The sum of these two effects is period (t+1) is discounted back 
by discount factor b , and is equal to the social marginal value of the initial investment in 
investment sector in period t, given by t2f . 
 
Condition (17.2) states that a marginal increment of capital investment in consumption sector 
in period t increases the quantity of available consumption goods at time (t+1) by the amount 
)(F 1tckc + , which has social marginal value 1t1 +f . This increment is adjusted by capital 
depreciation in investment sector, which has social marginal value 1t2 +f . Thus the aggregate 
increment in the quantity of available consumption goods net of depreciation at time (t+1) in 
social marginal value is equal to )]()(F[ dff -++ ++ 11t 1t2
c
kc1t1 . The first term is due to an 
increase in capital in consumption sector, while the second terms stands for an indirect 
increase in production of consumption good through increase in depreciated capital in 
investment sector. Thus the social marginal values of capital in two sectors are in general 
different. The increased tax revenue equal to ]~)([F 1ct
c
kc r1t +-+  enables the government to 
reduce other taxes by the same amount, and the reduction of this excess burden equals 
]~)([F 1ct
c
kc1t r1t ++ -+y . The sum of these two effects in period (t+1) is discounted back by 
the discount factor and is equal to the social marginal value of the available capital good in 
period t. 
 
The steady state versions of (17.1) and (17.2) imply that 
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and unless the term in parentheses is zero, the capital income tax in consumption sector is 
nonzero. Moreover, it is straightforward to show that if nnxnc uuu == , it is possible to undo 
the difference in social marginal value of capital by setting labour taxes equal across sectors. 
To see this, impose nnxnc uuu ==  in (16.1) and (16.2), combine these with (13.1b) and 
(13.1c) and (18), which gives that 012 =ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
- ff c
kc
x
kx
F
F cx tt =Û . 
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Constrained tax choice. 
 
The previous analysis concluded that the government’s optimal choice of steady state capital 
tax rates may vary across sectors. Consider, for instance, a class of utility functions for which 
nx
nc
nx
nc
u
u
V
V
= holds 5. The government’s set of policies for which a competitive equilibrium 
exists would then be: 
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implying that the government sets a limiting zero tax on capital income from consumption 
sector if and only if it sets labour income tax rates equal across sectors. Hence given that 
particular class of utility functions, for any subset of Ramsey policy that prescribes varying 
labour income tax rates across sectors, the optimal steady state tax on capital income from 
consumption sector is nonzero. Here we consider a case where the government faces a 
constraint to keep these taxes equal across sectors, i.e. same labour income tax rates and same 
capital income tax rates across sectors. In principle, it is predictable that such additional 
constraints in the Ramsey problem would necessarily worsen Ramsey equilibrium outcome 
relative to the one proposed earlier. Our prescription of a nonzero tax on capital income from 
consumption sector is backed up by a clear intuition that such a capital tax will not have 
compounding distortion effects as long as the government keeps the other capital income tax 
zero. If the government’s choice of capital income tax rates is constrained to be same ex ante, 
the only optimal rule for the government would be that both capital income tax rates are zero. 
Hence in a Ramsey problem with constrained tax choice, any nonzero optimal tax on capital 
income would be an outcome with lower welfare than the one proposed earlier. 
 
To test it formally, note that since the after tax returns to capital are equal across sectors in a 
competitive equilibrium, constraining capital income taxes to be same is tantamount to 
constraining pre-tax returns to capital across sectors to be same. In other words, one can test 
the restriction of equal capital income taxes across sectors by incorporating the additional 
constraint ttpt xkxt
c
kc "= ),(F)(F  in the Ramsey problem. Substituting for the equilibrium 
                                                 
5 One may consider the utility function as ]1[lnu(.) xtctt nnc --+=  which is supported by the lottery 
argument of Hansen (1985). This functional form is popular in real business cycle literature. 
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relative price of new capital goods, and imposing the constraint that government keeps the 
labor income tax rates same across sectors, the additional constraint becomes
nc
nx
c
nc
x
nx
x
kx
c
kc
u
u
F
F
.
F
F
= . 
Consider, therefore, the Lagrangian form of Ramsey problem with constrained tax choice for 
the government, 
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          (19.1) 
where { }¥=0321 tttt ccc ,,  is a sequence of Lagrange multipliers on the two resource constraints 
and the additional tax choice constraint. The necessary conditions for an optimum for this 
problem for changes in consumption, labor supply and one period ahead capital stocks are: 
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Consolidating (19.2) yields three necessary conditions for a Ramsey equilibrium, and the one 
of interest is: 
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Where 1+Q t  and tL  are terms comprising derivatives of (.)F
c  and (.)F x , evaluated at time 
t+1 and t, respectively, defined as6: 
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Recall the otherwise equivalent condition derived from Ramsey problem without tax choice 
constraint. For a 0T ³  for which gg t =  for all Tt ³ , and assuming convergence of the 
solution to the Ramsey problem to a time-invariant allocation, the time invariant version of 
(13.1a) implied )]([F db -+= 11 xkx , which acted instrumentally for the proof of proposition 
1. With the current Ramsey problem, for ¥®t , )](F)[( dqb -+-= 111 xkx
x  still holds in a 
Ramsey equilibrium. Unless )]([F db -+= 11 xkx  holds from the time invariant version of 
(19.3), it is trivial that 0¹xq  vis a vis 0¹cq . In proposition 3, it is formally proved that 
)]([F db -+= 11 xkx does not hold in Ramsey equilibrium with constrained factor income tax. 
Consider a 0T ³  for which gg t =  for all Tt ³ , and assume that the solution to the 
Ramsey problem (19.1) converges to a time-invariant allocation. The time invariant version 
of (19.3) is: 
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6 The time notations attached to the derivatives are omitted in defining 1+Q t  and tL , without loss of generality, 
just to avoid notational clutter. 
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In order to prove that both capital tax rates are nonzero, it is sufficient to prove that 0¹S , 
which in turn implies )]([F db -+¹ 11 xkx . 
 
Proposition 3:  For a steady state solution to the Ramsey  problem (19.1) and a 
corresponding Ramsey allocation, the two associated steady state tax rates on capital income 
are nonzero. 
 
Proof:  Suppose not, and hence 0=S  such that (19.4a) implies )]([F db -+= 11 xkx . 
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kc and 011 >-- )]([ db , for 
0=S , it must be that 011 >--+ )]([F db xkx , which is a contradiction.     
 
Thus if the government faces a tax choice constraint, the Ramsey equilibrium outcome 
comprises taxing capital income from both sectors at a strictly nonzero rate. This policy 
cannot be optimal since it leaves no way to avoid compounding tax liabilities. With this tax 
plan in the scheme, the household will not be able to avoid the compounding tax liabilities by 
simply shifting depreciated capital. 
 
 
Utility functions. 
 
In this section we characterize the optimal steady state capital income tax for consumption 
sector associated with the Ramsey equilibrium (13.1) with a variant of commonly used utility 
functions. Huffman & Wynne (1999) propose a class of utility functions that captures the idea 
of intratemporal labour adjustment cost assuming that shifting labour across sectors is costly.  
Their proposed functional form characterizes strict convexity of the function RR2 ®Á +:  
relevant to the current paper. Jones et. al (1997) present a useful specification of a utility 
function where the planner is unable to distinguish between income from two types of labour. 
We consider these utility function specifications for experimenting the key analytical results, 
acknowledging that there may be many other interesting cases to consider. 
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Equal marginal disutility of labour: 
 
Consider the broader class of utility functions : 
s
s
-
---
=
-
1
11 1)]exp([
),,( xtcttxtctt
nnc
nncU      (20.1a) 
 
with 0³s , the inverse of elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Consider u(.) as a special 
case of (.)U  where 1®s . As 1®s , using l’Hôpital’s rule, it is possible to show that 
 
)(ln),,u( xtcttxtctt nncnnc --+= 1       (20.1b) 
 
Specification (20.1b) that characterizes utility linear in labour services can be justified by the 
lottery argument of Hansen (1985). In the context of the current paper’s analytical tractability, 
such utility functions simplify the expressions of njV  by ruling out the second and cross 
derivatives of labour services. This specific form also exhibits unitary marginal rate of 
substitution of labour across sectors. While this simple assumption that workers receive equal 
marginal disutility from different sectors is typically held in a subset of multi-sector general 
equilibrium models, empirically, there is strong evidence against it for the case of the US 
industrial sector. The BLS survey 2002 reports suggests that injury related incidence per 100 
worker varies greatly across different industrial sectors, and incidence rates are relatively 
higher in goods-producing sector as compared to the service producing sector. Hence, one can 
argue that such utility functions are increasingly stylized and ignores the empirically 
supported evidence of varying disliking for jobs across sectors. 
 
The set of policies for the government which can be implemented in a competitive 
equilibrium, given (20.1b), is presented by: 
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which states that the optimal steady state capital income tax for consumption sector is zero if 
and only if the government keeps the two labour income tax rates equal across sectors. Now 
consider competitive equilibrium condition which states that the marginal rate of substitution 
of labour must equal the relative after tax wage rates. Given (20.1b), the marginal rate of 
substitution of labour across sectors is one. This implies the after tax wage rates across sectors 
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are equal (and not the tax rates). Hence for N
~
, the government’s optimal choice of labour 
income tax rates may or may not be equal across sectors, although both choices will generate 
allocations which can be implemented as a competitive equilibrium. In the particular policy 
choice where labour income tax rates vary, the government taxes capital income from 
consumption sector at a nonzero rate.  
 
A possible extension to this specification may be to consider varying marginal disutility of 
labour across sectors maintaining the assumption that utility is linear in labour services. The 
simplest form that specifies this idea is perhaps )],(1[)ln(),,u( xtcttxtctt nncnnc n-+=  
where RR: 2 ®+n  is a convex function and linear in its two arguments, such that 0=jj nnn  
and 0==
cxxc nnnn
nn . In order to incorporate the non-unitary marginal rate of substitution of 
labour in this functional form, one can define a parameter 0>m  such that 
xc nn
mnn = . Due 
to the empirical evidence from US industrial sector, it is sensible to assume that 1¹m . 
Invoking this specification yields the same policy set for the government as given by N
~
, and 
same conclusion holds. 
 
Intratemporal labour adjustment cost:  
 
This functional form, as mentioned earlier, is in the spirit of Huffman & Wynne (1999). 
Assume there exist some intratemporal adjustment cost of labour across sectors, and consider 
the following utility function: 
 
}])([{)ln(),,u( www yyz
1
11 --- -+-+= xtcttxtctt nncnnc     (20.1c) 
 
Where 01 >-£ zw ,  and 01 ³³ y . This specification of the utility function allows for the 
idea that it is costly to reallocate labour from one sector to the other. Note that with 
21 =-= zw ,  and 21=y , (15.1c) reduces to }{)ln( xtctt nnc --+ 1 , which exhibits 
unitary marginal rate of substitution of labour across sectors, and is tantamount to saying that 
the household receives equal disutility from labour services from the two sectors. In the 
context of the current setting, the restrictions 1-=w  and 21=y  together imply that 
marginal rate of substitution of labour across sectors is equal to one. There is an issue, of 
course, that how these costs should be interpreted here, which I will not focus in detail. 
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The marginal rate of substitution of labour across sectors for this specification, for all 
permissible values of w , is: 
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For any 1-<w , which can be interpreted as the adjustment cost parameter, the optimal 
steady state tax rate for capital income from consumption sector is: 
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With 0¹ncncu , 0¹nxnxu , 0¹ncnxu  and 0¹nxncu . This implies the set of policies at the 
government’s choice which can be implemented in competitive equilibrium comprises of cq  
which is nonzero, even in the case when the government sets labour income tax rates equal 
across sectors. 
 
Two types of labour: 
 
This particular functional form where labour services are of two specific types is due to Jones 
et. al (1997), and is intended to represent the case where the planner is unable to distinguish 
between income from two types of labour. A probable rationale for this utility function may 
be the often realized and empirically supported fact that producing capital goods is typically  
more skill-intensive than producing manufacturing consumption goods. The example 
considered therefore features one household that sells two types of labour in the market. Jones 
et. al (1997) invoke this specification with an ex ante restriction on the choice of labour 
income tax rates. I will consider the unconstrained version. Consider the following utility 
function: 
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with 0³s , and 0<jg . The marginal rate of substitution of labour across sectors is: 
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Since now the utility function has cross derivatives of consumption and labour supply, it is 
useful to state the following expression: 
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where  
 
1112 11111111 ---- ------+---º cxcxcx cxcxxxccxc nnnnnnnn
gggggg sgg )())(()()())(()(Y
 
cxcxcx
cxcxxxccxc nnnnnnnn
gggggg sgg )())(())(()()()(Z -------+--º ---- 11111111 1211  
 
It is straightforward to notice that for all permissible values of the parameter g , the condition 
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nx
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u
u
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=  does not hold. This implies the set of policies at the government’s disposal for 
which a competitive equilibrium exists (i.e. which can be implemented in a competitive 
equilibrium), 
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,),,,( , prescribes that an 
ex post choice of equal labour income tax rates is not sufficient to guarantee zero steady state 
tax on capital income from consumption goods sector.  
 
 
Concluding remarks. 
 
The paper formulated a two-sector neoclassical production model with infinitely-lived agents 
in order to analyze the optimal income taxation problem (the Ramsey problem) and examine 
celebrated optimal capital income taxation principle . The extension of one-sector model to a 
two-sector version with endogenous capital good’s price makes it convenient to scrutinize 
sector specific optimal capital income taxes in the steady state. The analysis reached a 
startling conclusion. We find that the optimal capital income tax is nonzero, in general, and 
the nonzero tax rate is optimal since its distortions can be undone by setting different labour 
income tax rates. We find that while it is optimal to set a long run zero tax on capital income 
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from investment sector, the optimal steady state capital income tax for consumption sector is 
nonzero in general. For a standard class of utility functions that has desirable properties, this 
result holds, and the set of conditions for which this tax rate is zero is in no way inferred by 
the equilibrium conditions. We also find that if the government faces a constraint to keep 
factor income tax rates same across sectors, the optimal capital income tax is nonzero. 
 
Our main result is based on the intuition that if capital is produced as a final good, its relative 
price is different than that of consumption goods. This is tantamount to having different social 
marginal value of capital in two sectors where it is used. This difference allows the 
government to tax/subsidize capital income in one sector and undo the distortion by setting 
different labour income tax rates. This paper thus advocates that the government’s long run 
tax policy comprises of three income tax instruments --- the two labour income tax rates and 
nonzero tax on capital income in the consumption sector --- all of which have uniform 
distortion pattern. Capital income from consumption sector can be taxed at a nonzero rate 
optimally without creating compounding distortions in the long run as long as the other 
capital income tax is set at zero. This allows economic agents to shift depreciated capital to 
the untaxed sector and avoid the compounding capital tax liabilities. 
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